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Foreword

This study is one of a series commissioned by the American Enterprise Institute on trends in the level and distribution ofU.S. wages, income, wealth, consumption, and other
measures of material welfare. The issues addressed in the
series involve much more than dry statistics: they touch on
fundamental aspirations of the American people-material progress, widely shared prosperity, and just reward for
individual effort-and affect popular understanding of the
successes and shortcomings of the private market economy
and of particular government policies. For these reasons,
discussions of "economic inequality" in the media and political debate are often partial and partisan as well as superficial. The AEI series is intended to improve the public
discussion by bringing new data to light, exploring the
strengths and weaknesses of various measures of economic
welfare, and highlighting important questions of interpretation, causation, and consequence.
Each study in the series is presented and discussed in
draft form at an AEI seminar before publication by the
AEI Press. Marvin Kosters, director of economic policy studies at AEI, organized the series and moderated the seminars. A current list of published studies appears on the last
page.
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH

President
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research
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1
The Low-Wage Argument
The chief and controlling question is one of labor, and
as long as the labor cost here [the United States] in any
department ofemployment exceeds the labor cost in Europe so long we must have a protective tariffwhich shall
compensate for this difference. And whether the labor is
in the rice fields of Georgia and of the Carolinas, or in
the wheat-fields ofthe Northwest, in the factories ofNew
England, the mines of Maryland and Virginia, or the
furnaces ofPennsylvania, Ohio, and NewJersey, it must
be protected against the less rewarded labor whose products come in competition with theirs. Either this tariff
must be maintained to maintain the difference between
wages or one of two things must inevitably occur: we
must abandon production in many of the most valuablefields ofindustry here or our labor must come down
to the standard of the competing labor.

his statement scarcely differs from those of Ross
Perot, Patrick Buchanan, and Richard Gephardt in
the 1990s, but it is actually from an 1888 congressional speech by Congressman William McKinley (later
president of the United States). I
The argument that low foreign wages provide an unfair competitive advantage has been widely held in the
United States for at least 150 years. As Frank Taussig (1920,
48-49) noted nearly eighty years ago,

T

This belief is not merely widespread: it is something like an article offaith with millions ofAmericans, probably with a majority of our people, and
is as firmly held by most of the business men and
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well-to-do as by the manual workmen. It has been
incessantly dinned into the ears of both by protectionists for half a century. That it is a potent
device for bolstering up protective tariffs is shown
by the fact that it is utilized, not only in our own
country, but in others also-in those with low
wages as well as those with high. In Germany,
France, and Italy, the appeal for the safeguarding
of the laboring man's wages against foreign competition is as universal and probably as fetching
as in the United States. And the appeal is sincere.
The argument has resurfaced with renewed vigor in
the United States and other industrial countries in recent
years, as the visibility and magnitude of trade with developing countries have increased. A plethora of recent popular
books reinforces popular anxieties about trade with Latin
America and Asia. 2 President Clinton's failure to obtain fasttrack authority to negotiate trade agreements in 1997 was
largely due to the widespread concern about trading with
low-wage countries.
Economists have long dismissed the low-wage argument as a fallacy. According to classical Ricardian trade
theory, international differences in labor costs do not preclude mutually beneficial trade. On the contrary, international trade theory suggests that the gains from trade
increase as economic diversity increases between partners.
Fears that high-wage countries are unable to compete with
low-wage countries often confuse the fundamental distinction between comparative and absolute advantage. Classical trade theory postulates that overall differences in
productivity (absolute advantage) determine wages, while
sector-specific variations in productivity and costs determine
trade patterns. Taussig (1920) observed:
A plain fact, universally known, is that we regularly export from the United States goods to the
value of billions of dollars. How can this be if lowpaid labor can always undersell high-paid labor?
(49)

STEPHEN S. GOLUB

•

3

The plain reason why wages are very low in India
and China, higher but still meager in countries
like Italy and Austria, comparatively high in England and Germany, and highest ofall in the United
States, is to be found in the varying productiveness of labor in these countries. (52)
While conceding that some workers in protected industries
gain from tariffs and that the reduction of barriers could
entail serious short-run adjustment difficulties for many
industries, Taussig (1920, 69) concluded that
it is untrue that high wages in general have been
caused by protection, or are now made possible
only by protection. They rest not on that feeble
prop, but on the solid foundation of industryon the resources of the country and the genius of
the people.
Although most economists are likely to agree that Taussig's
rebuttal of the low-wage argument is as valid today as it was
eighty years ago, they have not been successful in persuading the general public. 3 Part of the problem is that economists consider these principles so obvious that they often
dismiss opponents of free trade with theoretical demonstrations of the principle of comparative advantage. Most
critics-and the general public-are unimpressed with such
abstract arguments. This monograph attempts to show how
the empirical evidence supports the classical theory of international trade.
I first review the key theoretical distinction between
comparative and absolute advantage. According to classical international trade theory, wages are determined by the
overall productivityoflabor (absolute advantage) and therefore are not an independent source of international competitiveness. Trade patterns depend on industry-by-industry
productivity differences between countries (comparative
advantage). High- and low--wage countries gain from trading with each other, regardless of the wage levels of their
trading partners, by specializing in what each does well and

4
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importing goods that are most efficiently produced elsewhere. By increasing efficiency, international trade, like
technological change, increases the size of the economic
pie available to the nation. International trade does adversely affect some industries and individuals, especially in
the short run, but there are more than offsetting benefits
to the rest of the economy.
Later in the volume I address the empirical evidence
on trade patterns and the link between wages and productivity. The main findings of my research follow:
• The trade ofindustrial countries with developing countries in manufactured goods is roughly balanced. While
imports of manufactures from developing countries have
grown, exports to these same countries have also increased.
These two-way trade flows in manufacturing contradict the
presumption that developing countries have an across-theboard competitive advantage arising from low labor costs.
Moreover, this trade is, on the whole, much more important for the developing countries than the industrial countries. Imports of manufactured goods from developing
countries still represent a small share of developed countries' national output.
• Differences in wage rates largely reflect differences in
labor productivity, both across countries and over time.
Countries with low wages also exhibit low labor productivity. Thus, the costs of producing goods are not as different
across countries as the differences in wage rates alone would
suggest.
• U.S. labor market performance is inconsistent with
large negative effects of international trade on overall wages
or employment, although trade may be one of several factors contributing to the increasing dispersion of wages.
I then turn to some recent arguments advanced by
human rights groups in favor of the harmonization of internationallabor standards on moral grounds. While a few
abusive labor practices are almost universally condemned
as unacceptable regardless of the level of economic devel-
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opment, harmonization of wages and working conditions,
particularly if enforced by trade sanctions, may do more
harm than good for workers in developing countries. Most
arguments for international labor standards boil down to
the same confusion between comparative and absolute
advantage.

2
International Differences
in Wages

L

abor costs in the industrialized countries are much
higher than those in the developing countries, although labor costs vary greatly within each group
too. 4 Table 2-1 presents international comparisons of wage
rates expressed in dollars. (All such references in this volume mean U.S. dollars.) U.S. wages were well below those
of Germany but above those of the United Kingdom. For
medium-income countries such as Korea, labor compensation levels had reached nearly half those in the United States
by 1995, while low-income countries such as India and Indonesia had labor costs less than 5 percent of the U.S. level. 5
Wages in Japan, most European countries, and some
developing countries, especially some newly industrializing countries in Asia, have increased more rapidly than
wages in the United States. Mexican wages have declined
sharply both in absolute terms and in relation to the United
States. As discussed in chapter 6, these variations are driven
both by underlying differences in the growth of labor productivity and by shorter-run macroeconomic shocks. Exchange-rate variations in particular can have dramatic shortand medium-term effects on wages measured in dollars.
When the yen appreciates against the dollar, for example,
Japanese wages increase in dollar terms. This effect is evident in table 2-1, as 1980 and 1995 were years when the
dollar was weak against most other major currencies, while
in 1985 the dollar had reached a peak following steady

6
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TABLE 2-1
HOURLY LABOR COSTS FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS
IN MANUFACTURING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES,
1980,1985, AND 1995
(in U.S. dollars and as a percentage of U.S. labor costs)

1985

1980

$

%

8.94 90.6
France
Germany
12.33 124.9
5.52 55.9
Japan
United Kingdom 7.56
76.6
9.87 100.0
United States

$

1995

%

7.52 57.8
9.60 73.8
6.34 48.7
6.27 48.2
13.01 100.0

$

%

19.34
31.88
23.66
13.77
17.20

112.4
185.3
137.6
80.1
100.0

India
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia

0.44
0.16
0.96
0.73

4.5
1.6
9.7
7.4

0.35
0.22
1.23
1.08

2.7
1.7
9.5
8.3

0.25
0.30
7.40
1.59

1.5
1.7
43.0
9.2

Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Peru

1.71
1.75
2.21
0.64

17.3
17.7
22.4
6.5

1.30
1.87
1.59
0.30

10.0
14.4
12.2
2.3

4.28
3.63
1.51
1.24

24.9
21.1
8.8
7.2

NOTE: Labor costs in other countries are converted to U.S. dollars at the
market exchange rate. Labor costs include wages and fringe benefits.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Morgan Stanley estimates.

appreciation during the 1980s. Since 1995, the dollar has
again strengthened markedly against the currencies of other
industrialized countries and raised U.S. wages relative to
dollar wages of the other countries.

3
Comparative and
Absolute Advantage
conomists today credit David Ricardo (1772-1823)
for first drawing attention to the important distinction between comparative and absolute advantage.
The following hypothetical example, based on Ricardo's
principles, may help to explain the distinction to contemporary audiences.
Imagine that two countries-the United States and
Honduras-both manufacture computers and shirts. The
United States demonstrates higher productivity than Honduras in both industries, but the productivity ratio is
greater in computers (10 to 1) than in shirts (2 to 1).
Given a limited supply of workers, each country must sacrifice computer output to produce more shirts, and vice
versa. Moving one U.S. worker from computer production to shirt production entails a loss of ten computers
and a gain of two shirts, so the opportunity cost-the value
of the best alternative forgone when a choice is made-of
one shirt is five computers. In Honduras, by contrast, the
opportunity cost of one shirt is only one computer. The
opportunity cost of producing shirts is therefore lower in
Honduras than in the United States, and, conversely, the
opportunity cost of producing computers is lower in the
United States than in Honduras. Therefore, the United
States has a comparative advantage in computers, while
Honduras has a comparative advantage in shirts. This
determination of comparative advantage is independent
of differences in absolute productivity (absolute advantage). If Honduran productivity doubled in both indus-

E
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tries, for example, the opportunity cost of producing shirts
in Honduras would remain one computer, and comparative advantage would be unaffected.
This example can be used to show how absolute advantage determines international wage differences, while
comparative advantage determines trade patterns. To see
this, suppose that U.S. wages are six times Honduran wages
in both the shirt and the computer industries. 6 Because
U.S. workers are ten times more productive in computers
than Honduran workers but earn only six times more than
their Honduran counterparts, the United States will have
lower labor costs per computer. But Honduras will have lower
unit labor costs in shirts because U.S. workers are only two
times more productive in shirts, which is less than the ratio
of the countries' wages. Therefore, the United States will
export computers while Honduras exports shirts. This pattern of trade will occur as long as the difference in wages
between countries reflects the overall difference in productivity. More precisely, U.S. wages must be at least two
times and no more than ten times greater than Honduran
wages. 7
The living standards of both countries can increase
from trading according to comparative advantage. The
United States can obtain shirts more cheaply from Honduras than by producing them itself and can pay for these
shirt imports with computer exports. Recall that the domestic opportunity cost of one shirt is five computers in
the United States and one computer in Honduras. The
international terms of trade must lie between the two domestic opportunity costs. Suppose that one shirt can be
exchanged for three computers. Now imagine that Honduras produces one more shirt and exports this additional
shirt to the United States in exchange for three computers. Meanwhile the United States produces one less shirt.
In both countries shirt consumption is unchanged but computer consumption increases, as production according to
comparative advantage increases the availability of goods
for consumption.

10
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The example suggests that international trade does
not cost U.S. jobs but does change the industry mixture of
U.S. employment. American production of computers will
expand while shirt production contracts, with corresponding shifts in labor demand as a result. The reverse happens
in Honduras.
There are two qualifications to this characterization
of the benefits of trade. First, relocating workers between
the shirt and computer industries may be difficult in the
short run and cause some unemployment of former shirt
workers. Second, this kind of trade may reduce real wages
of unskilled workers even after workers are relocated if the
computer industry employs a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled workers than the shirt industry. In the United States,
as computer production expands and shirt production falls,
the demand for skilled labor rises, while the demand for
unskilled labor declines. As I argue below, however, the
proper policy response to these distribution effects is not
to restrict trade, but to ease the transition by compensating and retraining displaced workers.

4
Is Comparative Advantage
Obsolete?

S

ome argue that changes in the world economy have
made the principle of comparative advantage obsolete. In particular, critics note that international trade
increasingly takes the form of intracompany trade in parts,
unlike the computer and shirt example in the previous
chapter. More fundamentally, it is often argued that comparative advantage is no longer valid when capital is mobile. Let us consider each of these objections in turn.
It is true that international trade increasingly takes the
form of trade in intermediate products, often conducted
by multinational corporations, but the basic gains from
trade are unaffected. American companies locate the simpler parts of their production processes in developing countries, while the more sophisticated components are
produced at home. Twenty-one months after the North
American Free Trade Agreement went into effect, the Key
Tronic Company, a large manufacturer of computer keyboards, laid off 277 workers in Spokane, Washington, as it
relocated some assembly jobs to a plant in Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico. But Key Tronic's chief financial officer reported
that the employment in its Spokane plants actually increased because many components used in the keyboards
are made in Washington and the lower costs of assembly in
Mexico enabled the company to lower prices and to increase sales. 8 Similarly, AMP, Inc., exports connectors for
Pentium chips to its plants in Asia, where they are installed
in electronic equipment for the local market. AMP also
ships computer cables and connectors to its Mexican plant,

11
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where they are attached to one another and reexported to
the United States. 9
Hanson (1996) shows that economic integration with
Mexico has stimulated a boom in manufacturing production along both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. But while
Mexican factories specialize in assembly, which makes intensive use of unskilled labor, U.S. firms in the border region specialize in product design and the higher technology
production of components, which require higher-skilled
workers. This international division of labor follows the
principle of comparative advantage. The United States is
likely to have an absolute advantage in all stages of the production process, because American workers are, on average, more skilled and educated than those in developing
countries and the infrastructure in the United States is superior. But the U.S. efficiency advantage is likely to be greatest in the higher-technology components of the production
process, for which a highly skilled work force is critical.
The United States gains from the increase in efficiency resulting from the global division oflabor,just as in the simple
computer and shirt example. lO
Now consider the argument that the increased international mobility of capital and technology invalidates the
concept of comparative advantage. Many people worry that
as low-wage countries acquire technology and capital, their
productivity will rise and give them a competitive edge. It
is true that modifications to standard trade theory are necessary when capital is mobile. Capital mobility implies that
absolute rather than comparative advantage becomes the
determinant of the location of production, because capital
will move to where its productivity is greatest in absolute
terms.u If capital were perfectly mobile, one might indeed
expect massive capital flows from rich to poor countries, if
low wages in poor countries result primarily from small
capital-labor ratios and hence indicate high returns to capital. If so, as capital mobility increases, capital ought to flow
until capital-labor ratios are equalized around the world,
with an implicit, huge global reallocation of capital from
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rich to poor countries. But these concerns are greatly exaggerated in practice for a number of reasons.
First, low wages do not necessarily indicate high returns to capital, as Lucas (1990) demonstrates. Other factors, such as low levels of human capital (knowledge and
skills) as well as poor public infrastructure and transportation services, tend to hold down productivity in low-wage
countries even when they acquire new physical capital (computers and factories). These factors offset the appeal of low
wages for companies considering relocating their production to poor countries, except for products and production processes that require large amounts of unskilled labor.
Indeed, if low wages were all that mattered in international
trade, countries with rock-bottom labor costs such as
Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Burundi would be attracting massive amounts of foreign capital and rapidly becoming major exporters. While some very poor countries such as
Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Honduras are indeed developing fledgling manufacturing export industries, such countries export only the most unsophisticated products, and
the volume of trade and capital flows involved is small. Indeed, popular concern often focuses on countries such as
Mexico and South Korea, where wages are well above those
in Mrica and South Asia. 12 The key point here is that human capital, social organization, and infrastructure are not
mobile, and these immobile factors are critical in determining the productivity of labor.
Second, the mobility of capital itself is not as great as
often believed. While markets for short-term financial assets have become highly integrated worldwide, the volume
of long-term international capital flows remains limited in
practice. Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) continue to account for a small fraction of capital formation
in most developing countries, as shown in table 4-1. The
contribution of FDI to capital formation is even less if outflows of FDI are considered. In Malaysia and Singapore,
gross inflows of FDI were approximately half the domestic
capital formation in 1985-1990, but these countries also
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TABLE 4-1
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS TO SELECTED
REGIONS AND COUNTRIES, 1985-1995

(as a percentage of total domestic gross fixed capital formation)

Gross Inflows

Net Inflows

19851990

19911995

19851990

19911995

All developing
countries

8.0

6.4

4.5

3.7

Mrica

4.7

5.9

3.7

4.9

11.3

8.9

9.6

7.8

7.6

5.7

3.1

2.3

Brazil
Chile
Honduras
Mexico

3.1
21.5
6.4
16.9

2.7
9.2
5.3
10.4

2.0
12.5
6.4
15.5

1.8
5.0
5.3
9.6

Bangladesh
China
India
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand

0.3
14.5
1.2
1.9
43.7
59.3
10.2

0.2
16.2
1.5
0.8
21.2
23.3
3.7

0.3
12.7
1.2
-1.6
31.2
33.6
8.4

0.2
13.1
1.5
-0.7
15.5
13.7
3.0

Latin America
Asia

NOTE: Gross inflows represent inward foreign investment including equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intracompany loans. Net inflows
are inward investment minus outward investment.
SOURCE: UNCTAD (1997).

have sizable FDI outflows, and inflows decreased markedly
in 1991-1995. In other Asian countries the contribution of
FDI was much less. In fact, net FDI flows in Korea were
negative in both periods. Nor are the poorest countries
such as Bangladesh or India attracting large FDI inflows.
While the absolute size ofFDI flows to China has ballooned
in recent years, China's ratio of FDI inflows to capital formation remains moderate.
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Conversely, for the industrial countries as a group, net
FDI outflows to developing countries were only about 2
percent of the total capital formation in developed countries from 1985 to 1995. In short, FDI flows between the
two regions are small, relative to the capital formation in
both developed and developing countries-far short of the
massive reallocation of capital from rich to poor countries
that some observers had feared.
This point remains valid if a broader definition of capital flows inclusive of portfolio investment is used. The broadest measure of a country's international capital flows is the
change in net foreign asset position, which is equal to the
current account of its international balance of payments.
A nation's current account balance represents the difference between earnings and expenditures vis-i-vis the rest
of the world or, alternatively, the difference between domestic saving and investment. There have been exceptions
for some countries and time periods, but for the developing world as a whole, current account balances have been
fairly small relative to output. Developing countries classified as exporters of manufactures, for example, had current account balances as a ratio of the gross domestic
product of -0.48 percent in 1980-1989 and +0.22 percent
in 1990-1994. That is, net foreign asset positions for this
group as a whole hardly changed in the 1980s and 1990s.1 3
Put differently, for the developing countries as a group,
domestic investment was financed entirely by domestic saving, with almost no net contribution from capital inflows.
Third, if capital flows or other factors raise the productivity of the developing countries, wages will tend to
rise as well, so the competitive edge lessens. Even if wages
are rigid or artificially repressed, appreciation of the currencies of the developing countries could tend to offset
these countries' competitive advantage. I show in chapter
6 that wage movements do largely reflect productivity
growth. Furthermore, as the productivity and wages of poor
countries increase, the structure of their exports evolves,
as they are no longer competitive in the simplest labor-

16

•

LABOR COSTS AND TRADE

intensive products. The share of textiles and apparel in
Korean exports, for example, rose from 8 percent in 1960
to 40 percent in 1980 and then declined to 19 percent in
1993. 14 Korea increasingly exports higher-tech goods such
as machinery, semiconductors, and automobiles. The same
trend toward producing more sophisticated exports is also
evident to a lesser extent in other emerging economies in
Asia. Meanwhile, less-eleveloped countries such as China,
Bangladesh, and Honduras are becoming highly competitive in the most unsophisticated unskilled-labor-intensive
products. These shifting patterns of production illustrate
the continuing relevance of the principle of comparative
advantage.

5
Trade in Manufactured Goods
ncreasing trade in manufactured goods between developed countries and developing countries has been
one of the most significant developments in the world
economy in recent decades. In 1960, the exports of developing countries consisted mostly of primary products. As
early as 1970, three-quarters of Korea's exports consisted
of manufactured goods, but most other Asian developing
economies did not emerge as major exporters of manufactures until later. By the mid-1990s, manufactured goods
accounted for more than half of exports for a substantial
number of emerging economies. As noted, the structure
of manufacturing exports for these economies has evolved
away from simple labor-intensive products toward increasingly high-skilled products. Exports of manufactures have
been an important source of the phenomenal growth of a
number of newly industrializing economies, especially in
East Asia.
Several aspects of this trade are often overlooked. First,
bilateral trade in manufactures is on the whole much more
important for the developing countries than the industrial countries. Table 5-1 shows exports and imports of
manufactures (as a ratio of CDP) for some newly industrializing economies with the industrial countries. For many
of these developing countries manufacturing trade with the
industrial countries is now quite large in relation to the
national output of developing countries (Brazil and India
are exceptions).
Table 5-2 shows analogous trade data from the point
of view of the major industrial countries, also as a share
of their respective CDP. Trade with developing countries

I
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TABLE 5-1
TRADE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN MANUFACTURED
GOODS WITH ALL INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES,
1970, 1980, 1990, AND 1995
(as a percentage of developing country CDP)

Brazil
1970
1980
1990
1995
China
1990
1995
India
1980
1990
1995
Indonesia
1970
1980
1990
1995
Korea
1970
1980
1990
1995
Malaysia
1970
1980
1990
1995
Mexico
1970
1980
1990
1995
Thailand
1970
1980
1990
1995

Exports to
Industrialized
Countries

Imports from
Industrialized
Countries

Trade
Balance

0.3
1.1
2.2
1.7

2.8
2.2
1.5
3.1

-2.5
-1.1
0.6
-1.4

2.6
8.8

3.8
7.7

-1.2
1.0

1.1
2.1
3.8

1.8
2.2
3.3

-0.7
-0.1
0.5

0.1
0.5
4.8
6.4

5.0
6.3
8.5
8.7

-4.9
-5.8
-3.7
-2.2

6.1
14.3
15.2
12.3

9.8
11.4
11.6
13.9

-3.7
2.9
3.5
-1.6

8.0
9.3
19.1
34.0

13.6
19.1
31.3
47.4

-5.5
-9.8
-12.2
-13.4

0.8
0.7
3.7
19.3

4.3
5.7
6.8
16.8

-3.4
-5.1
-3.1
2.5

1.3
4.2
10.7
12.8

9.6
9.4
17.3
21.9

-8.3
-5.2
-6.6
-9.1

SOURCE: UN TARS trade database, IMF International Financial Statistics.
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5-2

TRADE OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES IN MANUFACTURED
GOODS WITH ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
1970, 1980, 1990, AND 1995
(as a percentage of industrialized country CDP)
Exports to
Developing
Countries

Imports from
Developing
Countries

Trade
Balance

1.1

1.7
0.8
1.3

0.7
1.2
2.3
3.3

0.4
0.5
-1.4
-1.9

4.2
5.2
4.6
3.1

2.8
3.4
4.6
2.0

1.4
1.8
-0.1

2.9
4.3
3.6
4.2

0.9
1.7
2.6
3.1

1.9
2.6
1.0
1.0

4.0
6.4
4.1
3.9

0.8
1.0
1.6
1.7

3.2
5.3
2.5
2.3

4.6
6.6
5.0
4.9

2.6
3.5
3.8
2.1

2.0
3.1
1.2
2.8

4.5
5.6
4.3
3.3

2.6
3.9
5.2
3.1

1.9
1.7
-0.9
0.2

1.0
2.1
1.6
2.1

0.6
1.7
2.6
3.5

0.4
0.5
-1.0
-1.4

Canada

1970
1980
1990
1995
France

1970
1980
1990
1995

1.1

Cermany

1970
1980
1990
1995
Japan

1970
1980
1990
1995
Italy

1970
1980
1990
1995
United Kingdom

1970
1980
1990
1995
United States

1970
1980
1990
1995

SOURCE: UN TARS trade database, IMF International Financial Statistics.
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as a share of the GDP of the industrial countries is generally much smaller than as a share of the GDP of developing countries, as a reflection of the much smaller GDPs in
developing countries. While the rate of increase of import penetration of developing country manufactures in
the markets of developed countries is sizable, the level
remains quite low in terms of the national output of developed countries.
Second, notwithstanding the rapid rise of exports of
manufactures from developing to developed countries, the
majority of these developing countries continue to run trade
deficits in manufactures, as imports have grown nearly as
much. Contrary to popular fears, trade with low-wage countries cannot possibly be an important source of deindustrialization-the decline in the share of manufacturing in
output and employment-since the major industrial countries continue to have manufacturing trade surpluses with
the developing world in the 1990s, except for the United
States and Canada, which have shifted to modest deficits.
Deindustrialization is discussed in chapter 7.

6
Labor Costs and Labor
Productivity, 1970-1995
ages and productivity are closely connected, as a
visual inspection of figures 6-1 and 6-2 makes
clear. Figure 6-1 shows a scatter plot of wages and
productivity for a large number of countries in 1990. 15 Figure 6-2 shows the same data for a smaller set of countries.
Regression analysis confirms this (see appendix C). Differences in productivity explain 70-80 percent of the international variation in rates of labor compensation.
Because wages and productivity of the developing economies are each a small fraction of their U.S. counterparts,
unit labor costs diverge much less than simple comparisons
of wage rates suggest. As shown in figure 6-2, wages in Malaysia in 1990 were 10 percent of wages in the United States.
But Malaysian labor productivity was also about 10 percent
of the U.S. level in 1990. Unit labor costs (the ratio of wages
to productivity) were approximately the same in Malaysia
and the United States, because the difference in productivity almost exactly offset the difference in wages between
the two countries. In this case, companies have no incentive to shift production from the United States to Malaysia.
In general, in ternational differences in unit labor costs
are much smaller than differences in wage rates suggest,
because the huge international disparities in wages mostly
reflect equally large differences in productivity. In fact, these
calculations indicate that, in 1990, unit labor costs in the
Philippines and India were actually higher than those in
the United States; that is, the productivity difference was
even larger than the wage difference.

W
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FIGURE

6-1

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGES
RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1990
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NOTE: Real product wages are equal to labor compensation deflated by
the value-added deflator for manufacturing, converted to U.S. dollars
at the market exchange rate. Productivity is real value added per employee, converted to U.S. dollars at the purchasing power parity exchange rate.
SOURCE: Author's calculations are based on UNIDO data as described
in appendix B.

Some disparities between relative wages and productivity are to be expected for several reasons. First, differences in wages sometimes reflect temporary exchange-rate
movements, which may have little effect on long-term busi-
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FIGURE 6-2
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, WAGES, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES,

1990
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Korea
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Mexico

a
~
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Unit labor cost

Brazil
Thailand
Malaysia
Philippines
India
SOURCE: See figure 6-1.

ness decisions about the location of production. The appreciation of the dollar against the mark and the yen in
the early 1980s, for example, sharply lowered German and
Japanese wages measured in U.S. dollars (see table 2-1).
The depreciation of the dollar in the late 1980s and early
1990s, however, led to a large increase in German andJapanese wages expressed in U.S. dollars. The depreciation of
the mark and especially the yen in 1996-1997 has partially
restored German and Japanese cost competitiveness. Second, because some differences in unit labor costs may be
offset by nonlabor costs, low unit labor costs do not necessarily imply a competitive advantage. Third, the available
measures oflabor costs and productivity are not always fully
reliable and comparable, especially for developing countries. Despite these qualifications a fairly close correlation

24

•

LABOR COSTS AND TRADE

between labor costs and labor productivity is observed
across countries.
Variations in relative unit labor costs over time depend
on several factors, such as relative productivity, relative
wages in domestic currency, and the exchange rate. Malaysian competitiveness will increase relative to the United
States, for example, when Malaysian productivity grows
more rapidly than U.S. productivity, Malaysian wages grow
more slowly than U.S. wages, or the Malaysian currency
depreciates against the dollar.
Table 6-1 shows annual growth rates of productivity
and real product wages between 1970 and 1995 in aggregate manufacturing for a number of countries. 16 Wage and
productivity growth are closely connected in most cases. In
the United States, real wages increased at about the same
rate as productivity over the 1970-1981 period, but real
wage growth was about 1 percent below productivity growth
in 1982-1995. I7 Stated differently, labor's share of income
in U.S. manufacturing was steady in the 1970s but fell somewhat in the 1980s and 1990s. Labor's share ofmanufacturing value added is shown in figure 6-3 for 1959-1995. Over
this longer period labor's share of manufacturing income
has not varied greatly. The decline in the 1990s has pushed
this share to just a little below its levels during the 1960s
and contradicts the belief there has been a big shift in income from labor to capital in manufacturing.
In other developed countries, wages and productivity
movements are also highly correlated. In Germany and Japan, wages actually increased more rapidly than productivity from 1970 to 1995, while in France and the United
Kingdom wages grew a little less rapidly than productivity.
Wages and productivity growth rates are also similar for most
developing countries. (Two exceptions-Mexico and Indonesia-are discussed further below.) Tables 6-1 and 6-2 do
show that for intervals of five to ten years or even more,
wage and productivity growth rates can differ, but over longer
time periods these growth rates tend to be very similar.
Figures 6-4 to 6-12 trace the movement over time of
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TABLE 6-1
GROWTH RATES OF REAL PRODUCT WAGES AND LABOR
PRODUCTIVIlY IN MANUFACTURING IN DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, 1970-1995

(in percent)

1970-1995 1970-1981
France
Productivity
Labor compensation
Germany
Productivity
Labor compensation
Japan
Productivity
Labor compensation
United Kingdom
Productivity
Labor compensation
United States
Productivity
Labor compensation

1982-1995

3.01
2.66

3.05
4.00

2.74
1.34

2.12
2.71

2.57
3.82

1.70
1.76

3.59
4.73

4.18
6.03

2.77
3.35

3.20
2.80

1.51
2.37

3.95
3.03

1.77
1.32

0.22
0.30

2.86
1.97

NOTE: Real product wages are equal to labor compensation per employee deflated by the value-added deflator for manufacturing. Productivity is real value added per employee.
SOURCE: Author's calculations are based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data as described in appendix B.

wages, productivity, and relative unit labor costs of selected
economies relative to the United States. The upper parts
of these figures show relative labor productivity (solid lines)
and labor compensation (broken lines). The lower parts
of the figures plot the ratio of the purchasing-power-parity
exchange rate to the market rate (broken line), as well as
two measures of relative unit labor costs in dollars, alternatively using the PPP exchange rate (PPP) and the market
exchange rate (E). An increase in PPP IE represents an
appreciation of the market rate relative to PPP. The dotted
line represents relative unit labor costs (RULC) when la-
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LABOR'S

FIGURE 6-3
SHARE OF INCOME IN U.S. MANUFACTURING,

1959-1995
IOOr---------------------,

80

60

40

20

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

bor compensation is converted at PPP. This construction
removes the effect ofexchange-rate movements on RULeit shows what relative unit labor costs would be if the real
exchange rate were held constant at the PPP level. The
solid line shows RULC with labor compensation measured
in dollars at the market exchange rate. Comparing the solid
line with the dotted line is another way of seeing the effects of changes in PPP IE. When the Japanese yen appreciates (relative to PPP) against the U.S. dollar, for example,
Japanese RULC measured at the market rate will increase.
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TABLE 6-2
GROWTH RATES OF REAL PRODUCT WAGES AND LABOR
PRODUCTIVIlY IN MANUFACTURING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 1970-1995
(in percent)

1970-1995 1970-1981

1982-1995

Chile
Productivity
Labor compensation

2.60
2.68

1.77
3.58

1.73
1.47

India
Productivity
Labor compensation

2.67
1.92

-0.26
-0.02

4.67
2.92

Indonesia
Productivity
Labor compensation

7.29
4.44

9.25
7.18

5.38
0.29

Korea
Productivity
Labor compensation

9.34
9.38

8.38
9.00

9.32
8.92

Malaysia
Productivity
Labor compensation

1.40
1.34

-0.71
-0.07

2.16
1.23

Mexico
Productivity
Labor compensation

3.67
-3.12

3.04
4.55

4.10
-7.02

Philippines
Productivity
Labor compensation

1.17
1.61

-3.87
-2.44

4.90
4.30

Singapore
Productivity
Labor compensation

4.24
3.62

4.15
2.59

4.48
3.47

Thailand
Productivity
Labor compensation

2.78
4.71

1.50
1.55

3.17
8.04

Real product wages are equal to earnings (exclusive of employerpaid fringe benefits) per employee deflated by the value-added deflator for manufacturing. Productivity is real value added per employee.
SOURCE: Author's calculations are based on UNIDO data as described in
appendix B.

NOTE:
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FIGURE

6-4

PRODUCTIVIlY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN GERMANY RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995
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Germany. As mentioned, fluctuations of the dollar-mark
exchange rate have entailed large swings of German RULe.
German unit labor costs rose sharply relative to the United
States over the 1985-1995 period (figure 6-4). In 1995,
German productivity remained about 20 percent below the
U.S. level, but German hourly labor compensation exceeded the U.S. level by about 85 percent. Thus, by 1995,
German unit labor costs were double those of the United
States. Most of the rise in relative German unit labor costs
is due to appreciation of the mark vis-a-vis the dollar, but it
also reflects the rise of labor's share of manufacturing income in Germany and a small fall of the same in the United
States. Surging unemployment in Germany is often cited
as a manifestation of the country's high labor costs. Surprisingly, however, Germany has continued to run trade
surpluses in manufacturing. IS
Japan. Despite rapid productivity growth in manufacturing, Japanese relative unit labor costs have increased over
the long term, asJapanese wages in yen increased even more
rapidly than productivity and, in addition, the yen appreciated against the dollar (figure 6-5). As several other studies (for example, McKinsey 1993) have shown, Japanese
productivity remained well below the U.S. level in 1990,
and the rate at which Japan is catching up has slowed dramatically. As in the German case, fluctuations of the exchange rate playa dominant role in medium-run wage rate
movements.
Korea. Korea's impressive relative productivity growth has
been accompanied by even more rapid relative wage growth
(figure 6-6). In 1970, Korean wages were 8 percent of U.S.
wages, while Korean productivity was 14 percent of U.S.
productivity. By 1995, Korean productivity had reached 69
percent of the U.S. level, while Korean wages grew to 48
percent of American wages. Korean workers have greatly
benefited from their country's phenomenal economic
growth.
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FIGURE

6-5

PRODUCTIVIIT, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN JAPAN RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995

(United States = 1.0)
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Other Countries in East Asia. For most of the East Asian
developing economies, relative wages were low compared
with relative productivity early in the sample period. Over
time, however, productivity and wage measures for most of
these economies have been converging. Malaysia, Thailand,
and the Philippines (figures 6-7 to 6-9) all experienced
large increases in unit labor costs relative to the United
States since 1970. For these East Asian countries, the appreciation of their exchange rates relative to PPP has offset all or some of the initial shortfall of wages compared
with productivity and has raised their relative unit labor
costs. In this important longer-run sense, exchange-rate
movements have been stabilizing for this group. Indonesia
(figure 6-10) is an exception with large declines in wages
relative to productivity since the early 1980s. The large
decline in Indonesian unit labor costs since the early 1980s
is at least partially due to the decline in world oil prices,
which appears to have had a strong influence on longerrun movements of the Indonesian currency. (The recent
sharp currency depreciations associated with the East Asian
financial crisis have undoubtedly slashed relative unit labor costs as well, but these effects are likely to be reversed
when the crisis eases.)
Mexico. In the 1970s, Mexican wages and productivity both
fluctuated around 25 percent of the U.S. levels; that is, relative unit labor costs did not diverge much from 1.0 (figure
6-11). The drop in Mexican relative wages after 1982 and
again in 1994 can be attributed to government austerity
programs following debt crises and provides an extreme
illustration of the adjustment of real wages to adverse macroeconomic shocks. The steep depreciation of the peso
enabled Mexico to service its foreign debt-at the cost of
a steep decline in the dollar value of Mexican wages. Mexican wages recovered relative to productivity after 1986
but fell back after 1994. Although this decline in Mexican
wages and unit labor costs in 1994-1995 and the subsequent shift of the Mexican trade balance from deficit to
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FIGURE 6-6
PRODUCTIVIlY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN KOREA RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995

(United States

= 1.0)

Productivity and Wages
0.70 r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . ,
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10

Unit Labor Costs
1.20
/ \ PPP/E

/'

\

1.00 I - - - - " " , - - " ' - , . L " ' - - - ' : - \ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
/
\
.... ~,
,
/
vI",
'
'_
' ... _",'"
"'~ ~
/
..../.......
0.80
"
I....

,,

------;

,

.1"

" .. "

•••••..••••••

:,/1
.....

0.60

\

0.40

Relative unit labor cost

0.20
0L-J--'-__'_..............L...-_'_~--'-__'___'_

1970

1974

1978

SOURCE: See figure 6-1.

..............L...-.L......JL-..L__'__'__'__'_.1__L._l._'__'

1986

1990

STEPHEN S. GOLUB

•

33

FIGURE 6-7
PRODUCTIVIlY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN MALAYSIA RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995
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FIGURE 6-8
PRODUCTIVITY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN THAILAND RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995
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FIGURE 6-9
PRODUCTIVITY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN THE PHILIPPINES RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES,

1970-1993
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FIGURE 6--10
PRODUCTIVITY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN INDONESIA RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995

(United States = 1.0)
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FIGURE 6-11
PRODUCTIVIlY, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN MEXICO RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1995
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FIGURE 6--12
PRODUCTIVI1Y, LABOR COSTS, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS
IN INDIA RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1993
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surplus are often cited by V.S. opponents of the North
American Free Trade Agreement as vindication of their
views that NAFTA would create a "large sucking sound" of
jobs being siphoned off to Mexico, the facts do not support the assertion. The drop in Mexican wages after 1994as in the early 1980s-reflects the collapse of the peso and
deep recession in that country. Indeed, manufacturing
employment in Mexico dropped nearly 10 percent in 1995.
As the Mexican economy recovers from the crisis, its wages
and unit labor costs are likely to increase, as they did from
1987 to 1991.
India. Wages and productivity in India remained about 5
percent of the V.S. level for most of the 1970-1993 period
(figure 6-12). In the 1990s, depreciation of the rupee associated with a stabilization package lowered relative wages.

In summary, these examples show that while macroeconomic shocks can induce large short-run deviations,
labor costs and labor productivity remain closely related,
both across countries and over time.

7
The U.S. Labor Market
and Trade with Low-Wage
Countries

ritics argue that the overall U.S. trade deficit and
the deficits with particular developing countries
such as China and Mexico reduce the number of
jobs in the United States. As evidence, they often cite the
decline of manufacturing employment. They claim that
other countries, such as Japan and those in Western Europe, have less open markets and consequently do not run
trade deficits like the United States. But these arguments
ignore the fact that overall U.S. employment growth over
the past twenty-five years has been impressive and has far
outpaced that ofEurope andJapan. Indeed, there has been
much discussion in these countries about how to emulate
U.S. employment performance.

C

U.S. Employment Performance
In 1997 the U.S. unemployment rate fell below 5 percent,
its lowest level since the early 1970s. In recent years the
labor force and employment have increased more rapidly
than the working age population: 4 million workers were
added in 1996 and the first half of 1997 alone. The New
York Times reported recently that the demand for labor is
so strong that "companies are recruiting among those ignored in the past: mothers at home with their children,
older men who had retired or been laid off, students, im-

40

STEPHEN S. GOLUB

•

41

migrants, people with criminal records. State officials [in
Louisville, Kentucky] who help former prisoners get jobs
say companies now reject fewer convicted felons."19
Therefore, while U.S. trade deficits do displace some
workers, any associated job losses have been more than
offset by overall job creation. In fact, the causation runs in
the reverse direction: the strength of the U.S. economy,
which manifests itself in employment growth, is an important cause of the overall U.S. trade deficit, since imports
rise with incomes. Recessions in Japan, Europe, and Latin
America, meanwhile, have held down U.S. exports.
Even in manufacturing, international trade has had a
secondary role in affecting employment trends. In 1994,
manufacturing accounted for 16 percent of all U.S. jobs,
down from 26 percent in 1970. A recent study found that
the U.S. trade deficit accounted for only one-tenth of this
decline; the remainder is mostly due to the difference in
productivity growth between manufacturing and the service sector (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997). As manufacturing productivity increases, fewer workers are needed
to produce a rising volume of output, and the released workers shift to the service sector. Much the same occurred in
agriculture earlier in the century. Technological change
and capital investment lowered the share of employment
in agriculture from 44 percent in 1900 to 3 percent today.
This process was undoubtedly painful for many displaced
workers, but few today would consider reversing the gains
in the standard of living afforded by the growth in agricultural productivity.
Nor is it true that the overall "quality" ofjobs has declined as the quantity has increased. Job growth has been
strong in high-paying as well as low-paying occupations, as
industries have shifted the occupational mixture of their
employees. Between 1983 and 1994, jobs in managerial,
professional, and technical occupations grew more rapidly
than overall U.S. employment (Committee on Economic
Development 1996). Once again, this does not deny that
significant numbers of workers have suffered because of
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job dislocation and wage declines, sometimes caused by
competition from imports. The overall performance of
employment, however, is at variance with the popular view
that international trade is devastating American labor.

Wage Inequality
Increased inequality of wages has been one of the most
salient features of the American labor market in recent
decades. While average family income has increased, the
gap between higher-income and lower-income families has
widened sharply.20
Increased income inequality in the United States is
primarily the result of greater dispersion of labor incomes,
not a shift from labor to capital. The share oflabor income
in total national income has been remarkably steady in
recent decades and, despite a small decline in the 1990s, is
higher than in the 1960s. Even in manufacturing, labor's
share of income has varied little. It is true that wages have
grown less rapidly since 1973 than earlier in the postwar
period, but this mostly reflects the slowdown in productivity growth, not an increase in capital's share of national
income.
Instead, greater dispersion of labor income is the primary source of increased inequality. While increased wage
inequality is not necessarily a bad thing-it may reflect a
more competitive and discerning labor market-the plight
of those at the lower end of the income distribution is a
source of concern. The causes of this increased wage inequality are controversial, but a major factor is a greater
demand for skilled labor, as evidenced by a large increase
in the wages of college graduates relative to the wages of
workers without a college education. There are two main
possible sources of increased demand for skilled labor: international trade and skill-biased technological change. The
question here is the role played by international trade.
As we saw in the hypothetical example of U.S. and
Honduran computer and shirt manufactures in chapter 3,
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international trade with poor countries can be expected to
increase the relative demand for skilled labor in United
States, since the United States expands production in industries that make intensive use of skilled labor and it imports goods created largely by unskilled labor. Such trade
may cause not just a widening in the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled labor but also an absolute decline in
the real income of unskilled workers. Also, the widening
wage inequality has coincided with an increase in international trade with low-wage countries and suggests a possible connection.
Although there may be a connection between increased trade and income inequality, many studies conclude
that international trade with low-wage countries has played,
at most, a secondary role in increasing income inequality.
As one recent survey of the literature concludes, "Nearly
all of this research finds only a modest effect of international trade on wages and income inequality" (Slaughter
and Swagel 1997). The small effect of trade on wage inequality in the United States is not so surprising when one
considers the small size of such trade. Although imports of
manufactured goods from developing countries have expanded rapidly, in 1995 they still amounted to only 3-4
percent of U.S. gross domestic product and 7 percent of
the value of manufacturing production. More than half of
U.S. imports of manufactured goods still corne from other
industrialized countries, some with higher wages than the
United States (see table 2-1). Most economists think that
technological change, which has increased demand for
workers with higher skills, is mainly responsible for the rise
in the demand for skilled rather than unskilled labor and
the resulting increase in wage inequality. Many economists
believe that advances in information technology, such as
computers and telecommunications, are at the heart of the
changes affecting the U.S. economy (Greenwood 1997).

8
International Labor
Standards

A

more recent variant of the low-wage argument focuses on working conditions and benefits rather
than wages. Weak labor market regulations in
developing countries are a source of unfair competitive advantage, critics assert, adding that low wages and labor standards violate the human rights ofworkers in the developing
countries. The most commonly proposed solution to these
problems is the international harmonization of labor market regulations by raising standards in developing countries to those in their more developed counterparts.
Labor Standards and International Competitiveness

The unfairness argument focuses on fringe benefits and
safety conditions rather than wages, but it reflects the same
confusion of comparative and absolute advantage discussed
above. First, for a given level of labor costs, the division
between wages and fringe benefits is largely irrelevant for
international competitiveness, although it may not be a
matter of indifference to workers. Second, wages are the
most important component of labor costs even in developed countries. Third, mandating increases in fringe benefits such as vacation and maternity leave may simply alter
the composition of labor compensation and not its total
size. Fourth, even where they do affect labor costs, weak
labor standards, like low wages, are likely to be a consequence of low productivity and poverty, not an independent source of international competitiveness.
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Economic development, cultural differences, or other
national preferences may give rise to different choices about
labor standards. These national characteristics, along with
the availability of land, capital, labor, and other factors of
production, determine national comparative advantage. 2 \
Low labor standards and low wages both reflect the abundance of unskilled labor and low productivity in developing countries. Trade barriers in response to differences in
labor standards would reduce the gains from trade without dealing with the root cause of differences in labor standards-the level of economic development.
Concerns about Human Rights
Human rights activists believe that raising labor standards
in developing countries will benefit workers in these countries. In addition, they view some labor practices as morally intolerable. To analyze these concerns, it is important
to separate labor standards relating conditions of work
such as minimum wages, health and safety benefits, hours,
and possibly minimum age of employment from labor
rights such as bans on forced labor, harassment, and discrimination.
Everyone agrees that improvements in the standard
ofliving in the developing countries are desirable. The question is how to achieve this. Attempting to mandate certain
labor market practices, such as minimum wages, under
conditions where they are inappropriate, may sometimes
be counterproductive toward the ultimate objective of improving labor market outcomes. Imposing most developed
country labor standards is simply not feasible for many
countries, at least in the short term. It is deeply disturbing
to us, for example, that in some countries young children
toil under harsh conditions for low pay. But the income
that they earn may be crucial to their family's survival. And
imposing stricter labor standards in the formal sector may
do little more than consign children to even more degrading and less remunerative work in the informal sector.

46

•

lABOR COSTS AND TRADE

In addition, many developing countries have detailed
labor standards, but these may cause more harm than
good. In the NAFTA debate in the United States, it was
widely recognized that Mexico's legislated labor standards
were often stronger than those of the United States and
Canada, although enforcement was often weak. Labor
market regulations such as minimum wages are often cited
as a major contributor to the problem of economic dualism in developing countries, that is, excessively high wages
and high unemployment in urban areas.
Trade and labor market policies that are conducive to
economic growth are more likely to raise labor incomes
than is mandating levels ofwages and benefits (Fields 1995).
Such growth-oriented labor market policies need not be
laissez faire. Government investments in education and
training in particular are likely to be beneficial. Because
the loss of access to markets in the developed world will
hamper the growth prospects of developing countries and
thereby retard the upgrading oflabor standards, trade sanctions are likely to be counterproductive.
National labor market policies may sometimes enhance both efficiency and equity by remedying market failures. But this problem should be left to each country to
decide for itself. One frequent argument is that the nondemocratic political regimes in much of the developing
world prevent the expression of the public's true preferences. Even if it is accepted that a developing country is
not democratic, it does not follow that developed countries can legitimately impose higher standards, and that
doing so will raise welfare in the developing country. Instead, a more direct and effective method of expanding
the public's voice in the setting of standards is to encourage the spread of democracy in the developing world.
Finally, if the goal is to enhance the welfare of developing countries, trade sanctions hardly seem an appropriate and effective approach. Srinivasan (1995) points out
that the most effective way to raise standards for workers in
developing countries would be to allow free international
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migration from low- to high-standard countries, an argument rarely made by proponents of harmonizing labor standards. Even if immigration is judged not feasible, direct
income transfers, which could be used for upgrading living standards in the developing countries, would be more
consistent with humanitarian motives-as well as more efficient economically.
Some labor practices, most obviously slavery and harassment of workers, are regarded as unacceptable virtually everywhere. Bhagwati (1995, 754) cautions, however,
that "universally condemned practices such as slavery are
rare indeed." The provision on child labor of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1996,
26), for example, calls for the "elimination of exploitative
forms of child labor." Defining exploitation in practice is
likely to be difficult: most parents care about their children, and what at first glance appears "exploitative" child
employment may be a family's desperate response to poverty. Limits on collective bargaining may also be defensible
at times. In developing countries, unions often protect a
tiny labor aristocracy to the detriment of the remainder of
the work force. Nondiscrimination between men and
women may not be accepted in some Islamic societies. Without a clear basis for international agreement, enforcement
of labor standards could degenerate into protectionism.
Another argument against the harmonization of basic
labor rights is the arbitrariness of the focus on labor rights
to the exclusion of other human rights problems, such as
lack of freedom of expression. The focus on labor rights
rather than human rights in general suggests that economic
considerations more than ethical concerns underlie some
calls for the harmonization of labor standards.

9
Conclusions

T

he expansion of manufactured exports has been a
vital stepping stone in the economic development
ofa number of East Asian countries, and many other
developing countries are now embracing trade liberalization. Many rich countries, conversely, have greeted the
emergence of developing countries as exporters of manufactures with considerable ambivalence because of widespread concern about competition with countries with low
wages and labor standards.
I have tried to show in this monograph that these fears
are greatly exaggerated. There is nothing unfair about low
wages. Differences in wages largely reflect differences in
labor productivity and are not a form of unfair competition. Developing countries tend to specialize in producing
goods mostly by unskilled labor, while the United States
specializes in producing more sophisticated goods by more
skilled workers. The expansion of trade between the highwage and low-wage countries benefits most people in both
types of countries regardless of wage differences. The effects of this trade are much more significant for the developing countries than the industrial countries.
In the case of technological change, benefits to the
overall standard of living outweigh the associated disloca~
tions to those whose skills become obsolete. The economic
effects of international trade are similar: trade and new
technology both raise the general standard of living while
hurting those whose occupational skills are devalued. Many
people recognize that new technology entails a shift in the
composition ofjobs rather than a net loss ofjobs but fail to
understand that the same is true for international trade: by
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specializing according to comparative advantage, countries
increase their productive efficiency with little net effect on
job creation.
Although technological change is probably far more
important than international trade as a cause of wage inequality, trade does adversely affect some workers. Rather
than restricting trade-and losing the clear benefits it provides to our society overall-government policy should focus on improving the social safety net and retraining
displaced workers for new employment in a stronger and
healthier economy.

APPENDIX

A

Decomposition of Relative
Unit Labor Costs
Let aij represent unit labor requirements (the inverse of
productivity) for sector i in country j:
(A-I)

where Q is value added and L is labor employment. Marginal productivity and hence aij are assumed to be constant
with respect to variations in Lij.
Competitiveness in sector i in country j compared with
country k also depends on wages (wij and W ik ) and the bilateral exchange rate (ejk ) , which determine relative unit labor cost, denoted by Cijk in a common currency:
(A-2)

A useful transformation of relative unit labor cost of
country j relative to country k (equation A-2) can be obtained by multiplying and dividing by the PPP exchange
rate PPPjk to obtain equation (A-3). (The sector subscript i
is now suppressed since the focus here is mostly on aggregate manufacturing.)

a·w

a

. PPPjk
(A-3)
akwk'jk
ak WJYPPjk
'jk
Equation (A-3) illustrates the tripartite decomposition
of relative unit labor costs into relative productivity, relative
wages evaluated at the PPP exchange rate, and the level of
the market relative to the PPP exchange rate.
Cjk
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APPENDIX

B

Methods and Sources
Methodological Issues
Measuring Real Output. The most widely used measure of
output, and the one adopted in this volume, is constantprice value added. This is a natural choice for calculating
the productivity of labor since intermediate inputs should
be deducted. The use of this measure, however, has recently
been criticized by Jorgenson (1993, 51), who argues that
using value added "severs the connection between productivity and international competitiveness." Instead,
Jorgenson advocates the use of gross output because competitiveness is based on output prices, not the price of value
added. The force of Jorgenson's criticisms, however, can
be questioned. International trade increasingly takes the
form of trade in components, with the assembly and production of parts taking place at a different locations. When
all components can be imported, international competitiveness depends on the value-added price rather than on
the output price. Because in reality some intermediate inputs are more tradable than others, the issue of whether
value-added or output prices are better indicators of competitiveness is an empirical question.
The great advantage of using real value added is that
it is readily available on a national accounts consistent basis for a wide range of economies over time. An important
implication of this section is that it remains a useful although imperfect measure of productivity.
Purchasing Power Parity Conversions. To compare levels
(as opposed to rates of change over time) of real outputs
51
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across economies, they must be converted to a common
currency.22 The market exchange rate is likely to be misleading because of the well-known failure of purchasing
power parity to hold, at least in the short run. Instead, a
purchasing power parity exchange rate (PPP) is needed. A
difficult question is which of the available PPPs to use, since
all are imperfect (see discussion below).
Measuring Labor Input. Another potential problem is measuring the quantity and quality of labor input. In particular, productivity per hour worked is of more interest than
productivity per worker, but that measure is not available
for the developing countries. For purposes of this volume,
however, these problems are of lesser importance, since
competitiveness is measured by unit labor costs rather than
productivity per se. Data on total labor compensation and
total product of labor are sufficient to calculate unit labor
cost. Hours worked cancel in the numerator and denominator. Similarly, the problem of quality adjustment is lessened since higher-skilled labor presumably both receives
higher compensation and has higher productivity.
Data Sources
Productivity is calculated as value added per employee,23
deflated by the value-added deflator and converted to dollars at a purchasing power parity exchange rate. 24 Wages
are defined as total labor compensation per employee,
converted to U.S. dollars at the market exchange rate. 25
For the developed country comparisons of productivity and
labor costs, I used published and unpublished data from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on value added
and total labor compensation per hour worked. For developing countries, the primary data source is the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
INSTAT database, as published in the World Bank World
Tables. Value added, price deflators, employment, and labor compensation data are available from this database. In
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a few cases (Malaysia, Korea) the World Tables data were
updated from national sources. The market exchange rate
was also obtained from World Tables. When comparing the
United States and the developing countries, I used the
UNIDO INSTAT data for the United States for consistency.
The UNIDO data have several drawbacks. First, the
value-added data follow the census definition rather than
the national accounts compatible definition used by the
BLS. The main difference is that census value added does
not deduct some service inputs from gross output in deriving value added. Second, labor compensation as reported
by UNIDO includes fringe benefits such as maternity pay
and payment in kind but excludes employer contributions
to social insurance funds and is thus an incomplete measure of labor costs.
There is no readily available measure of purchasing
power parity exchange rates for manufacturing for most
countries. The available PPP measures are based on expenditure rather than production. I chose the producer durable
PPP from the Heston-Summers International Comparison
Project (ICP), as obtained from World Bank data sources
(1993).26 Although producer durables are not necessarily
representative of all manufacturing, they have several advantages, at least relative to other readily available options. First,
production-based PPPs are not available for many of the
economies in this sample, so the only recourse is the expenditure-based ICP PPPs. Second, producer durables are fully
tradable, unlike most other ICP categories. Third, producer
durables are classified under investment, which suggests they
are closer to output-based measures than the ICP consumption sectors. Fourth, comparison of the ICP producer durable PPPs with available production-based PPPs for some of
the economies in my sample suggests that the producer durable PPPs are a reasonable choice. Nonetheless, the possibility that producer durables are not representative of overall
manufacturing output PPPs means that the productivity and
unit labor cost levels (as opposed to their rates of change)
should be regarded as rough estimates, with confidence intervals between ±20 percent.

APPENDIX

C

Statistical Analysis of
Productivity and Wages
Figure 6--1 displays the cross-sectional relationship between
productivity and wages in 1990. Figure C-l shows the same
relationship as figure 6--1 except that wages are converted
to dollars at the PPP exchange rate rather than at the market exchange rate. Figure C-l appears to show an even
stronger connection between productivity and wages than
figure 6--1. Since productivity is converted to a common
currency at the PPP exchange rate, using the PPP exchange
rate for wages removes the effect of deviations of the exchange rate from its PPP value in comparing productivity
and wages. If market exchange rates display short-run volatility but revert to PPP in the long run, it may be more
meaningful to use a common PPP exchange rate in converting both wages and productivity to a common currency.
Statistical analysis confirms the visual impressions from
figure 6-1 and figure C-l. Cross-section regressions of
wages on productivity in 1990 were estimated:
(C-l)
where the dependent variable is the wage in country i relative to the United States (country u), and the independent
variable is the relative productivity of country i (or the inverse of the relative unit labor requirements a/ au) (see table
C-l). Four variants of equation (C-l) were tried, alternating between levels or logarithms of the variables and between the market exchange rate and the purchasing power
parity exchange for converting wages. All four specifica54
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FIGURE C-l
LABOR PRODUCTIVllY AND PPP WAGES,
RELATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, 1990
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Real product wages are equal to labor compensation deflated by
the value-added deflator for manufacturing and converted to U.S.
dollars at the purchasing power parity exchange rate. Productivity is
real value added per employee, also in U.S. dollars at the purchasing
power parity exchange rate.
SOURCE: Author's calculations are based on UNIDO data as described in
appendix B.
NOTE:

tions yield similar results. The coefficient on productivity
is close to 1.0 and highly statistically significant, and the If
is .7 to .8 in all cases. That is, international differences in
productivity by themselves explain 70-80 percent of the
international variation of wage rates. As the visual compari-
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TABLEC-1
REGRESSIONS OF WAGES ON PRODUCTIVIlY
wjwu = a+ Bajaj+£j

Productivity

R2

-.04
(0.05)

1.30
(0.13)

71.0

Levels with wages at
PPP exchange rate

-.01
(.03)

0.95
(.08)

79.2

Logs with wages at
market exchange rate

.11

1.25
(.09)

80.7

(.06)

Logs with wages at
PPP exchange rate

-.04
(.05)

1.08
(.07)

83.4

Variables

Constant

Levels with wages at
market exchange rate

NOTE: Dependent variable is country i wages relative to U.S. wages; independent variable is country i productivity divided by U.S. productivity. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author.

sons of figures 6-1 and C-1 suggest, the use of PPP exchange rates for wages is slightly more successful than using market exchange rates. Also, expressing the variables
in logs improves the fit and narrows the difference between the choice of conversion factor for wages.
In summary, the regression results confirm the strong
cross-sectional correlation between wages and productivity discussed in chapter 6.

Notes
1. Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives on the Mills bill,
May 18,1888, cited in Taussig (1921,549).
2. See, for example, Greider (1997).
3. Similar controversies in Europe predated those in the United
States. Irwin (1996, 153-60) discusses the evolving debates of
economists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The view
that low foreign wages adversely affected manufacturing competitiveness was widely held in the mercantilist period. As early
as 1701, Henry Martyn disputed this and noted that high wages
could reflect high productivity. Nassau Senior wrote in 1830 that
"to complain of our high wages is to complain that our labor is
productive" (cited in Irwin 1996, 160).
4. In this study, unless noted otherwise, wages refer to total
labor compensation including employer-paid fringe benefits. In
some cases, however, data are not available for these fringe benefits, as discussed in appendix B.
5. Labor costs differ by industry; these industry variations, however, are swamped by the overall differences in wages between
countries. Focusing on manufacturing averages is therefore not
misleading.
6. Skill-adjusted wages will be the same in different industries
within a country if the labor market is competitive and workers
can freely move between industries. Wage differences will be
eliminated as workers shift from the lower-paying to the higherpaying industry. Wage equalization does not occur at the international level, however, because of limits on immigration. As
observed in note 5, the assumption that wages are equal in different industries within countries but not between countries is roughly
true in reality.
7. The theory does not imply that wages and productivity are
equalized in all industries. The evidence in Meade (1991), for
example, that developing countries' productivity in industries
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such as shirts and steel is relatively high compared with wages is
entirely consistent with the distinction between comparative and
absolute advantage.
8. "NAFTA Tradeoff: SomeJobs Lost, Others Gained," New York
Times, October 7,1995, p. AI.
9. "Reconsidering a Trade Equation," New York Times, October
31,1997, p. DI.
10. Feenstra and Hanson (1995) provide a theoretical analysis of this form of comparative advantage. One difference between their results and the textbook analysis is that skilled labor
reaps the gains from trade in both the United States and the
low-wage country. This result is plausible because there is some
evidence that the gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled
workers is widening in developing countries, just as it is in developed countries.
11. Jones (1980) analyzes the implications of capital mobility
in a Ricardian model. This analysis is reproduced in chapter 9 of
the Caves, Frankel, and Jones (1996) textbook.
12. China's effort to develop an aircraft industry is often presented as a counterexample. But China's exports consist overwhelmingly of low-technology items such as clothing, shoes, and toys.
13. See IMF (1996), chap. 4 for further discussion.
14. World Bank World Development Report, various issues.
15. Appendix B discusses the sources and methods of the measures of wages and productivity.
16. Real product wages are nominal wages deflated by the
manufacturing value-added deflator.
17. When wages are deflated by the consumer price index
rather than by a manufacturing producer price index, the shortfall of wages relative to productivity is larger. This may reflect the
much discussed problem of bias in the CPI. In any event, for
assessing competitiveness, it is real product wages that are relevant, even though real consumption wages are what matter for
the well-being of workers.
18. There are several possible explanations for the seemingly
enormous competitive disadvantage of German labor. Perhaps
the data exaggerate the shortfall of German productivity and the
excess of German wages relative to their U.S. counterparts, but
the figures reported here make use of commonly used estimates.
The productivity estimates may fail to capture German manufacturers' reputation for quality, although in principle high quality
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should be reflected in reported high German value added. Second, Germany fares relatively better in comparisons with its European trading partners-who also have high labor costs-than
with the United States. Third, government subsidies to industry
may partly compensate for high German labor costs. Finally, the
data here are for West Germany. If East Germany or a united
Germany were included, average wage rates would surely drop
significantly (but so would productivity).
19. 'Jobs Opening Faster Than They Can Be Filled," New York
Times,July 10,1997, p. AI.
20. See Gottschalk (1996) for a summary of the facts; see other
articles in the same issue of the Journal ofEconomic Perspectives for
additional discussion. Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1997) also
present a detailed discussion.
21. See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996) for an analysis of
the ways labor standards might affect comparative advantage.
22. See Hooper and Vrankovich (1997) for a detailed discussion of this issue. See also Hooper and Larin (1989).
23. For the comparisons between developed countries, productivity and labor costs are adjusted for hours worked. For the
developing countries, however, no data on hours were available.
In any case, adjustment for hours is irrelevant for calculation of
unit labor costs as it cancels out in the ratio of labor costs to
productivity.
24. PPP exchange rates are used for international productivity comparisons to eliminate the distorting effects of exchange
rate volatility. See Hooper and Vrankovich (1997) for further
discussion.
25. For comparisons between the United States and the developing countries, "wages" include fringe benefits received by
workers, for example, maternity pay and payment in kind, but
exclude employer contributions to social insurance funds, because of a lack of data for the developing countries. To the extent that such employer contributions account for a larger share
of labor costs in the United States than in most developing countries, relative U.S. labor compensation is understated. Any such
understatement is limited, however, since employer contributions account for only about 20 percent ofU.S. labor costs, which
is not very different from the share of employer contributions
in labor costs in the few developing countries for which this
breakdown is available.
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26. ICP comparisons were made for 1975, 1980, and 1985 although not all economies are covered in each benchmark survey. For each of the three benchmarks, a time series of PPP can
be obtained by extrapolation with an appropriate price index.
The price index used here, whenever possible, was the manufacturing value-added deflator. When a country appeared in more
than one of the three comparisons, an average was taken.
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